Without assuming any knowledge on source's codebook and its output signals, we formulate a Gaussian jamming problem in block fading channels as a two-player zero sum game. The outage probability is adopted as an objective function, over which transmitter aims at minimization and jammer aims at maximization by selecting their power control strategies. Optimal power control strategies for each player are obtained under both short-term and long-term power constraints. For the latter case, we first prove the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium, and then provide a complete solution for both maxmin and minimax problems. Numerical results demonstrate a sharp difference between the outage probabilities of the minimax and maxmin solutions.
Introduction
The problem of jamming in wireless networks started to attract interests in the 80's when several works [1, 2] studied simple, point-to point communication systems affected by intelligent jammers. The jammer was assumed to have access to either a noise-distorted version of the transmitter's output [1] , or the transmitter's input message [2] . The mean-squared error was considered as a performance metric.
The saddle-point policy of the jamming game formulated in [1] consists of an amplifying transmitter and a jammer that performs a linear transformation of the transmitter's output signal. A deterministic problem (shown to display no saddle point) and a probabilistic one are investigated in [2] . It is interesting to note that for the probabilistic formulation, the saddle point is attained when the jammer ignores its information about the transmitter's output. Similar results were obtained in [3] for correlated jammers suffering from phase/time jitters at acquisition or at transmission. Channel capacity was used as the objective function.
Relatively few papers on this subject followed in the sequel until lately when several extensions to more complex, multi-user channels with fading were derived in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . It is shown in [5] that, in the absence 1 of channel state information (CSI) at both transmitter and jammer, an equilibrium point is obtained when the jammer completely ignores its information about the encoder's output.
Broadcast and multiple access channels (MAC) are investigated in [6] under a complete CSI and uncorrelated jammer assumption. The sum-rate is used as a performance indicator for the broadcast channel, while this role is played by an arbitrary weighting of the user's rates for the MAC. Proofs of existence of multiple Nash equilibria and conditions for uniqueness are provided. Similar results for the multiple access channel are presented in [7] . The paper covers all possible cases in terms of CSI and correlation of the jammer with transmitter's output, for a two-transmitter, one jammer scenario.
The general tendency seems to be in favor of an assumption that jammer has access to either the transmitter's output or input and consequently is able to produce correlated jamming signals. Uncorrelated jammers are often studied only as a particular case. We, however, argue that the correlation assumption is sometimes inappropriate because of the effect of causality. Although the jammer can acquire information about the transmitted data, there are significant time delays between the original signal and the jamming signal at receiver, which is not taken into consideration in previous works. In addition, most recent works adopt ergodic capacity as a common objective function over which transmitter and jammer fight against each other [5, 7] , which is not a suitable metric if delay constraint is considered.
An interesting different point of view is expressed in [9] , where the jamming problem is viewed as a special case of an arbitrarily varying channel. Capacity (when it exists) and λ-capacity (maximum transmission rate that guarantees a probability of error less than λ) are given for both peak and average power constraints, under random coding.
In this paper, we take a look at the jamming problem in a constant-rate wireless system with power and delay constraints, under deterministic coding. Without the presence of a jammer, our scenario would be similar to the one studied in [10] . We also consider a block fading channel with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Each codeword in a frame of length n = M N is assumed to span M blocks each of which consists of N channel uses. Channel fading variable remains constant over each block and varies independently across different blocks. Moreover, all M coefficients of a frame are assumed available to both transmitter and jammer non-causally [10] . However, the jammer has no knowledge about the output of the transmitter, or the codebook the transmitter uses. Figure 1 is similar to that in [7] . The difference, however, is that we investigate the jamming in delay constrained block fading channels, and hence the probability of outage is an objective function, where the outage probability is defined as the probability that the instantaneous mutual information of the channel is lower than the transmission rate [10] . While [7] assumes no delay constraint and employs ergodic capacity as an objective function.
The new objective function under the delay constraint makes the new jamming and anti-jamming problem quite challenging to solve. We first formulate the new problem as a two-person, zero-sum game with the outage probability as a cost function. In this paper, we only consider pure strategies (no randomized strategies). Two scenarios are investigated, namely, the short term and long term power constraints for both the transmitter and jammer. Our contributions in solving these problems can be summarized as below:
• For the short-term power constraints case we show the existence of and find a Nash equilibrium point;
• We prove that for the case with long-term power constraints there does not exist a Nash equilibrium point of pure strategies.
• For this latter case, we find the maximin and minimax solutions. Traditional methods of optimization, such as the KKT conditions, are not appropriate to solve our problem completely. We therefore seek a new, more intuitive approach:
-We first discuss the case of one block per frame (M = 1), which helps build intuition, and provide the optimal strategies for power allocation between frames.
-The generalization to M > 1 is not straightforward because of the new challenge of allocating power between the blocks within a frame. An entirely new, general framework is then developed for any arbitrary M > 1. The minimax and maximin solutions exhibit different inter-frame power allocation strategies, but share the same method for power allocation between blocks.
-We give a practical implementation algorithm for each of the two solutions. Our numerical results further demonstrate the non-existence of Nash equilibria for the long-term power constraint case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the channel model and problem formulation. Section 3 deals with the sort term power constrained problem, for which a Nash equilibrium point is provided. Section 4 studies the problem with long term power constraints, and is divided into six subsections. The first one proves the non-existence of Nash equilibria. Maximin and minimax solutions for the particular case M = 1 are derived in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Subsection 4.4 presents the strategies for allocating power between the blocks in a frame when M > 1. Using the results therein, the maximin and minimax solutions for M > 1 are given in Subsections 4.5 and 4.6. Numerical results are given in Section 5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
Channel uses

Channel Model and Problem Formulation
The channel model is given in Figure 1 . Transmission in a block fading channel is depicted in Figure 2 , where each codeword spans a concatenation of M blocks, each of which has N channel uses. As assumed in [10] , we let N → ∞ in order to average out the impact of Gaussian noise.
Over a given frame, the transmitter (Tx) allocates power P m to block m, 0 ≤ m ≤ M − 1, while the jammer (Jx) invests power J m in jamming the same block with the worst possible jamming signal which is not correlated with the transmitter's output and white Gaussian distributed [11] .
The channel squared fading coefficient h m is constant over the length of one block. The vector h = [h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h M −1 ] of channel coefficients over a whole frame is assumed to be perfectly known to transmitter (Tx), receiver (Rx) and jammer (Jx) before transmission begins.
The mutual information over a subchannel m when transmitter uses a real Gaussian codebook is given by I(h m , P m , J m ) = 1/2 log(1 + hmPm probability, which makes it a two-player zero sum game. Strategies consist of varying transmission powers based on the CSI about h. Both Tx and Jx only look for optimal pure strategies.
Jamming Game with Short-Term Power Constraints
The game with short-term power constraints is the less complex of the two games we discuss in the sequel.
In this game, the transmitter's goal is to:
while the Jammer's goal is to:
We shall prove that this game is closely related to a different two player, zero-sum game, which has the mutual information between Tx and Rx as a cost/reward function:
This latter game is characterized by the following proposition:
The game of (3) and (4) has a Nash equilibrium point given by the following strategies:
where λ and ν are constants that can be determined from the power constraints.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of Section IV.B in [7] , and is outlined in Appendix A.1.
The connection between the two games above is made clear in the following theorem, the proof of which follows in the footsteps of [10] and is given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. Let P * (h) and J * (h) denote the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game described by (3) and (4) . Then the original game of (1), (2) has a Nash equilibrium point, which is given by the following pair of strategies:
where U(R, P, J ) = {h ∈ R M + : I M (h, P * (h), J * (h)) ≥ R}, and where P a (h) and J a (h) are some arbitrary power allocations satisfying the power constraints respectively.
Jamming Game with Long-Term Power Constraints
Non-existence of Nash equilibrium
The long-term power constrained jamming game can be formulated as:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector of channel coefficients h = (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h M −1 ) ∈ R M + , and P and J are the upper-bounds on average transmission power of the source and jammer, respectively.
Contrary to the previous short-term power constraints scenario, if long-term power constraints are used it is possible to have P M (h) > P for a particular channel realization h, as long as the average of P M (h) over all possible channel realizations is less than P.
Let m denote the probability measure introduced by the probability density function (p.d.f.) of h, i.e.,
Integrating with respect to this measure is equivalent to computing an average with respect to the p.d.f. given by f (h), i.e., dm(h) = f (h)dh.
Both transmitter and jammer have to plan in terms of power allocation, considering the probability distribution of the channel coefficient vector, and their opponent's strategy.
Suppose the two opponents play simultaneously. Let S ∈ R M + denote the set of channel realizations over which the transmitter invests non-zero power. The jammer will not transmit over a set on which the transmitter power is zero, because outage will occur on that set even without jammer. Hence, the jammer will concentrate its power over some subset X of the set S , of m-measure given by its power constraint, and induce outage on all of X . The transmitter will now choose to save the power P X it used over X , and concentrate it over a different set X ′ of non-zero m-measure, where it can achieve reliable communication and hence decrease outage probability. The jammer finds itself transmitting over a set on which the transmitter is not present, so it changes its strategy once more.
This kind of instability leads to the following result.
Theorem 2.
There is no Nash equilibrium for the jamming game with long-term power constraints in our scenario.
Proof. Over any frame, exactly one of the situations described in Table 1 has to occur. 
Consider a set A of channel realizations h, with positive m-measure. Assume that every frame with h ∈ A is characterized by state "Outage", P M (h) > 0 and J M is fixed. Then the transmitter can improve its strategy by cutting off transmission on part of A , and using the power it saves for achieving reliable communication over the rest of A . This remark eliminates Cases 2 and 5 in Table 1 This proves that no equilibrium point exists for the game of (9) and (10).
In the following subsections we investigate the maximin and minimax solutions first for the case M = 1 and then for M > 1. The particular case of M = 1 provides intuition, as well as a simpler solving method, which can serve as verification of the more general, different method used for M > 1. When M > 1 the problem becomes more involved, since a new level of strategies has to be established: the strategies of allocating power between the blocks in a frame. The difference between the maximin and minimax solutions will verify the non-existence of Nash equilibria.
Note that if the transmitter plays first (minimax solution) the only possible cases of Table 1 are Cases 2 and 4, while if the jammer plays first (maximin solution) the possible situations are the ones covered by Cases 3 and 1.
Maximin Solution for M = 1
The maximin solution is defined as the set of optimal strategies when the jammer plays first. No matter what strategy the jammer employs, the transmitter will take advantage of its weaknesses, and try to obtain a minimum of the outage probability. The best option for the jammer is to maximize the minimum achievable by the transmitter.
Note that in a real situation, neither of the two players will play first, hence none of them will gain access to its opponent's strategy. This is why the maximin solution should be thought of as the worst case scenario for jammer, and the best case scenario for transmitter.
Let X ⊂ R + denote the set of channel realizations over which the jammer invests non-zero power. The transmitter will not transmit any power over a frame that is going to end up in outage. Therefore, it will start allocating enough power to the frames over which reliable transmission is easiest to achieve, and go on with this technique until the average power reaches the limit set by the power constraint.
The jammer needs to find the best choice of the set X , and its optimal power allocation strategy J M (h) over X , such that when the transmitter employs its optimal strategy, the probability of outage is maximized. , where c = exp(2R) is a given constant. It is easy to see that the larger J M (h) is for a particular h, the more difficult it is for the transmitter to achieve reliable communication. Therefore, the transmitter prefers the frames over which the required P M (h) is relatively small.
Note that the power needed by a player to achieve its objective (reliable communication for transmitter, and outage for jammer) over some frame, given a fixed opponent's behavior, will be denoted as "required power". Depending on its optimal strategy, this power may or may not be actually employed by the player.
Let S ⊂ R + denote the set of channel realizations over which the transmitter uses non-zero power. The jammer should deploy some J M (h) over X such that the required P M (h) is constant over the whole interval X . The purpose of jammer being active over X \ S is to "intimidate" the transmitter. The transmitter plays second, and hence takes advantage of the jammer's weaknesses. It always chooses to be active on the subset of X on which the required P M (h) is least. This is why the optimal jammer strategy is to display no weakness, i.e. to make P M (h) constant over X .
These considerations are formalized in Theorem 3 below. Before proving the theorem, we provide some insightful comments. Consider the set S of channel realizations over which the transmitter allocates nonzero power. Let K denote the maximum level of power required for the transmitter to communicate reliably on S . Because of the way the transmitter chooses the set S , this implies that the required transmitter power outside S is at least K. On the other hand, the required transmitter power over X \ S should be no greater than K, and hence equal to K, because otherwise the jammer would be wasting power.
The next Proposition deals with the optimum way of allocating the jammer's power over S . Consider S as a linearly ordered subset of the positive real line.
Proposition 2. The jammer should adopt such a strategy as to make the transmitter's best choice of S
intersect X on the the left-most part of S , and the required transmitter power equal to some constant K on
Proof. Consider that the jammer picks a certain strategy J M (h). Because the transmitter's strategy is predictable, the jammer knows exactly the set S over which the transmitter will transmit, as well as the maximum level of required transmitter power that will be matched by transmitter. Denote this level by K.
Take two sets
is the power required for the transmitter to establish reliable communication over the block characterized by the channel realization h.
We will show that if this is the case, then for the same K, the jammer can improve its strategy., i.e. there is a different choice of J M (h), which maintains the level K, but requires more power from the transmitter to achieve reliable communication over the same S . But since the transmitter already uses all of its power for the first J M (h), and the required transmitter power outside S is larger than K, the transmitter has no choice but to reduce the set S to one of its proper subsets. This is equivalent to increasing the probability of outage.
Hence such a pair of sets (A , B) cannot exist under the maximin solution.
Denote the necessary transmitter power allocation functions over A and B by P M,1 (h) and P M,2 (h) respectively. The power invested by the jammer over the interval A B is
while the power invested by the transmitter for obtaining reliable communication on the two intervals is
Next, we attempt to decrease the transmitter's necessary power on B and increase the transmitter's necessary power on A , while keeping the power invested by jammer constant. There are two cases to be considered as illustrated in Figure 3 for an intuitive description of the technique.
Case II
Transmitter's required power without jammer Figure 3 : Improving the jammer's strategy Case I: Assume we can take enough jamming power from B, to make the required transmitter power on
. Note that r(h) and l(h) are the jamming power taken from h ∈ B and the jamming power added to h ∈ A respectively.
Then, allocating the jammer power such that the required transmitter power functions are K instead of
the power invested by the jammer stays the same.
However, the power invested by the transmitter in achieving reliable communication is now:
Obviously 
Hence the transmitter is required to use more power in achieving reliable communication over A B.
Case II: Now suppose the jamming power on B is not enough to make the required transmitter power on A equal to K. Then the jammer can just stop transmitting over B, and use the saved power to increase the required transmitter power on A from P M,3 (h) to some P M,4 (h) ≤ K.
Thus, we can find some power allocation function P M,4 (h) ≤ K such that
, the changes in jamming power over A and B respectively. While the power used by the jammer does not change if it transmits such that P M,1 (h) is replaced by P M,4 (h) and it stops jamming on B, the power needed at the transmitter is now
Following the same arguments as in Case I, the term in parentheses turns out positive, and hence the transmitter's required power is increased.
The argument above implies that for any pair of sets A , B of positive measures, with the property
N /h. This is equivalent to the statement of the Proposition.
We can now state the main result of this section. 
, for some h * 1 < h * 2 ∈ R + and some constant K ∈ R + {∞} is an optimal jammer strategy for the maximin problem. (Note that P M (h) should be continuous at h * 1 .) The values K, h * 1 and h * 2 that maximize the outage probability can be found by solving the following problem:
and h 2 is given by
Proof. The feasible solution above (unique up to sets of measure zero) follows from the following observations.
• By Proposition 2, the only optimal power allocation for the jammer is such that the required transmitter power on S X should be equal to some positive K and the intersection S X should fill in the left-most part of S .
• If the maximum value of the transmitter's required power on S X is K, then the required transmitter power on X \ S should also be equal to K, because otherwise either the jammer (if > K), or the transmitter (if < K) would be wasting power;
• Since the transmitter chooses the regions with the lowest required power first, the required transmitter power on R + \ (S X ) should be larger than K (and hence continuity of P M (h) in h * 1 follows);
• Since the transmitter's required power without jammer is a decreasing function of h, and that it is easier for the jammer to impose a power K to the transmitter at lower h, the set S \ X should be situated on the right-most side of the positive real line R + .
These observations imply that an optimal jamming strategy is to make the required P M (h) equal to K
. Under these conditions, the transmitter's strategy is to transmit over the set [h * 2 , ∞) (S X ), where S X can be any subset of X with the measure resulting from the transmitter's power constraint. For simplicity, the numerical problem above considers S X to be the right-most side of X , i.e. an interval
However, this is not mandatory. The transmitter can choose any part of X (as long as it stays within the limits of its own power constraints), without influencing the probability of outage. This is because the power invested by the transmitter on any subset of X equals a constant K times the m-measure of that subset. Hence the transmitter will always pick subsets of equal measure, and the probability of outage is determined only by this measure.
Recall that the transmitter only transmits if it can achieve reliable communication. Therefore, outage will only occur outside of S .
The power allocation is depicted in Figure 4 . Picking some K, we can determine h 1 , h 2 and h 0 (in this order), and then find the probability of outage as
The optimal K, resulting in h * 1 , h * 2 and h * 0 , is the one minimizing the m-measure of the set (h 0 , ∞).
Finite upper and lower bounds for the optimal K can be derived easily. The lower bound K min can be found from the condition that X ⊂ S :
An upper bound K max can be derived (and updated) in the following manner. Take an arbitrary K 0 and solve for the corresponding h 0 0 , h 0 1 and h 0 2 . Now K max is the value that yields h 2 = h 0 0 , i.e. the solution of:
Minimax Solution for M = 1
The minimax solution is defined as the set of optimal strategies when the transmitter plays first. The jammer will always take advantage of the transmitter's weaknesses, and try to obtain a maximum probability of outage. The best option for the transmitter is to minimize the maximum outage probability achievable by the jammer. The minimax solution should be thought of as the worst case scenario for the transmitter, and the best case scenario for the jammer.
Let X , S ⊂ R + denote the sets of channel realizations (frames) over which the jammer and transmitter use non-zero powers, respectively. We then have the following straightforward observations:
• The jammer will not transmit any power over a frame if an outage is not going to be induced or if the transmitter is not present, i.e. X ⊂ S .
• The jammer will start allocating power to the frames over which an outage is easiest to induce, and go on with this technique until the average power reaches the limit set by its power constraint.
Consequently, from the transmitter's point of view, we need to find the best choice of the set S , and the best power allocation P M (h) over S , satisfying the power constraints, such that, when jammer employs its optimal strategy, the outage probability is minimized. The jammer can induce outage over a frame, with
Hence, the jammer prefers the frames for which the required J M (h) is less. The optimal transmitter's strategy is to allocate its power such that the required J M (h) is constant on the whole set S , and hence to display no weakness.
These considerations are formalized in Theorem 4 below. Before proving the theorem, we provide some insightful comments.
Let K denote the maximum value of the required jamming power over X . Then the required jamming power on S \ X cannot be less than K, because then the jammer's choice of X is not optimal, and cannot be larger than K, because then the transmitter would be wasting power. The next Proposition deals with the optimum way of allocating the transmitter's power over X . Proposition 3. The transmitter's optimal way to allocate its power is to make the required jamming power remain equal to some constant K on all of X .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and is deferred to Appendix B.1.
The main result of this section is the following theorem. , for some h * x ∈ R + , is an optimal strategy for the minimax problem. The values K and h *
x that minimize the outage probability can be found by solving the following problem numerically:
Proof. The feasible solution above (unique up to sets of measure zero) follows the observations listed below:
• By Proposition 3, the required jamming power on X should be equal to some positive K ;
• The required jamming power on S \ X should be equal to K, because otherwise either the jammer (if < K) or the transmitter (if > K) would be wasting power;
• Since it is easier for the transmitter to impose a certain jamming power K at higher h, the set S should be situated on the right-most side of the positive real line R + .
The jammer's strategy is to transmit on any subset of S , as long as it satisfies its own power constraints.
For simplicity, the numerical problem above considers that the jammer transmits on the left-most part of S , i.e. on an interval of the form [h * x , h * 0 ]. However, this is not mandatory. The jammer can choose any part of S (as long as it stays within the limits of its own power constraints), without influencing the probability of outage. This is because the power invested by the jammer on any subset of S equals a constant K times the m-measure of that subset. Hence the jammer will always pick subsets of equal measure, and the probability of outage is determined only by this measure.
Recall that the jammer only transmits if it can induce outage. Therefore, outage will occur with certainty on X and outside S . The numerical problem is described in Figure 5 . Picking some K, we can determine h x and h 0 (in this order), and then find the probability of outage as
The optimal K, resulting in h *
x and h * 0 , is the one maximizing the m-measure of the set (h 0 , ∞).
Note that the optimal K should not be looked for among values less than K min = J . An upper bound K max can be derived (and updated) in the following manner. Take an arbitrary K 0 and solve for the corresponding h 0 0 and h 0 x . Now K max is the value that yields h x = h 0 0 , i.e. the solution of:
Power Allocation between Blocks in a Frame for M > 1
If the number of blocks M in each frame is larger than 1, the game between transmitter and jammer has two levels. The first (coarser) level is about power allocation between frames, and has the probability of outage as a cost/reward function. This is the only level that shows up in the case of M = 1. The second (finer) level is that of power allocation between the blocks within a frame.
In this subsection we only deal with the second (intra-frame) level of power allocation for the maximin and minimax problems. The first (inter-frame) level will be investigated in detail in the following two subsections.
The probability of outage is determined by the m-measure of the set over which the transmitter is not present or the jammer is successful in inducing outage. This set is established in the first level of power control. Note that the first level power allocation strategies cannot be derived before the second level strategies are available.
In the maximin case (when jammer plays first), assume that the jammer has already allocated some power J M to a given frame. Depending on the channel realization, the value of J M , and its power constraints, the transmitter decides whether it wants to achieve reliable communication over that frame. If it decides to transmit, it needs to spend as little power as possible (the transmitter will be able to use the saved power for achieving reliable communication over another set of positive m-measure, and thus to decrease the probability of outage). Therefore, the transmitter's objective is to minimize the power P M spent for achieving reliable communication. The transmitter will adopt this strategy whether the jammer is present over the frame, or not.
The jammer's objective is then to allocate J M between the blocks such that the required P M is maximized.
In the minimax scenario (when transmitter plays first) the jammer's objective is to minimize the power J M used for jamming the transmission over a given frame. The jammer will only transmit if the transmitter is present with some P M . The transmitter's objective is to distribute P M between blocks such that the power required for jamming is maximized.
The two problems can be formulated as:
Problem 1 (for the maximin solution -jammer plays first)
Problem 2 (for the minimax solution -transmitter plays first)
The following proposition provides a result that we shall use in the sequel. Due to the intuitive nature of the result, we defer the proof to Appendix B.2. Denote x m = J m + σ 2 N . Without loss of generality, throughout the sequel we assume that the ratios x m /h m , with m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , M − 1 are always ordered increasingly, i.e. [10] .
Solution of Problem 1
The transmitter's optimization problem:
has linear cost function and convex constraints. Write the Lagrangian as:
With the notation c = exp(2RM ), the resulting KKT conditions yield the unique solution [12] :
where
and M ′ is the least integer in {1, 2, . . . , M } such that λ < x n /h n for n ≥ M ′ , and [z] + = max{z, 0}. We say the transmitter is "non-absent" over blocks {0, 1, . . . , M ′ − 1}, and "absent" on other blocks.
The following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix B.3, states that the jammer should only be present where the transmitter is non-absent. Hence, jammer's problem can be formulated as:
and x m ≥ σ 2 N , for m = 1, 2, . . . , M − 1.
Since M ′ is a function of the jammer power allocation {J m }, m = 0, 1, . . . , M − 1, solving the optimization problem above analytically is difficult. This is why we provide a search algorithm for finding the , the Lagrangian can be written as
This yields the new KKT conditions:
where M ′′ is the set of indexes of the blocks on which the jammer transmits non-zero power. Note that M ′′ is the cardinality of M ′′ .
For fixed M ′ and M ′′ , the jammer's optimal strategy has to satisfy these KKT conditions.
To find all possible solutions, multiply (35) by x n , and get
The expression above states that for any two block indexes i < j belonging to M ′′ , we have
Now note that for any two block indexes i < j not belonging to M ′′ (i.e. x i = x j = σ 2 N ) we also have
The following proposition states that indexing the blocks in increasing order of the x i /h i ratios is equivalent to indexing in decreasing order of the channel coefficients h i . Its proof is deferred to Appendix B.4.
Proposition 6. The optimal jamming strategy is such that if
Substituting (38) into (30), we get a new expression for λ:
which together with (29) yields
An interesting remark which supports the results of the next subsection, is that for the optimal solution
of Problem 1µ has to be strictly greater than zero, hence eliminating the possibility that the jammer allocates positive power to blocks where the transmitter, although "non-absent", could allocate zero power. In Appendix B.4 it is shown how this remark follows from Proposition 6.
Summing over n ∈ M ′′ in (38), and using the constraint (36), we get
for n ∈ M ′′ and x n = σ 2 N for n / ∈ M ′′ .
To solve for µ, substitute (43) into (38):
The algorithm implementation is described below.
while M ′′ > 0:
Compute µ from (44).
for n = 0, 1, . . . , M ′ − 1 compute x n from (43), let x n = σ 2 N for n ≥ M ′′ , compute P n from (29). Note that the complexity of this algorithm is in the order of M 2 .
An interesting situation occurs when both transmitter and jammer are present over the same M ′ blocks.
Along with (43) and (38), this assumption implies Proposition 7. Under the optimal maximin second level power control strategies, the "required" transmitter power P M over a frame is a concave function of the power J M that the jammer invests in that frame.
Solution of Problem 2
To solve the minimax intra-frame power allocation problem by using the same techniques as in Problem 1 turns out to be more difficult. Instead we use the above solution of Problem 1 and show that for both problems, the second level power allocation follows the same rules. Thus, any power distribution of P M,1 we pick, we should always obtain an optimal solution of Problem 2 for which J M ≤ J M,1 . But any such a solution has to satisfy the first constraint with equality, hence is also a solution of Problem 1. In turn, this implies J M = J M,1 . But then the original pair (P * , J * ) is a solution of Problem 2, since it is feasible and yields the same cost/reward function.
We have shown that any solution of Problem 2 is also a solution of Problem 1, and any solution of Problem 1 is also a solution of Problem 2.
Although the second level optimal power allocation strategies for the maximin and minimax problems coincided, this result should not be associated to the notion of Nash equilibrium, since the two problems solved above do not form a zero-sum game, while for the game of (9) and (10), first level power control strategies are yet to be investigated.
We need to characterize a particular channel realization in terms of the second level power allocation technique. Considering the maximin problem, we can map each channel vector h to a unique curve in the plane P M (J M ). That is, for fixed h, we increase the jammer's power over the frame from 0 to ∞, and compute the transmitter power P M (J M , h) required for achieving reliable communication. We have already mentioned that P M (J M ) is a continuous, concave function. As the jamming power increases from 0, both jammer and transmitter make choices as to which blocks each one should use. Recall that M ′′ is the number In the remainder of this subsection we present the particular case of M = 2 as an example of intra-frame power allocation.
Particular case: M=2
The case of M = 2 is the simplest and most intuitive illustration of the second-level power control strategy. Since we already showed that the second level minimax and maximin strategies coincide, the following considerations refer to the maximin scenario only. The jamming power J M has to be allocated between the two blocks in a way that maximizes the transmitter's expense, should it decide to achieve reliable communication over the frame.
The jammer and the transmitter can each transmit over either one or both blocks. All possible situations are considered next.
Recall the previous convention x 0 h 0 ≤ x 1 h 1 , which is equivalent to h 0 ≥ h 1 . We already know that the jammer attacks blocks with the largest channel coefficients first (x 0 ≥ x 1 ).
Hence if the jammer is only present on one block of the frame, then that is the block with coefficient h 0 . This implies x 1 = σ 2 N , and x 0 = (2J M + σ 2 N ). Under these assumptions, the transmitter will only transmit on the first block if
Otherwise, the transmitter is present over both blocks, performing water-pouring as in (29), with
Note that the transmitter being present only on the second block would contradict Proposition 6.
We also know that, should the jammer decide to allocate non-zero power over both blocks, its optimal strategy is such that
, then the transmitter is present over both blocks. In this case, we can particularize (29) to M = 2 and obtain:
Define the ratio r =
Setting the derivative of P M with respect to r equal to zero, we get the unique solution
The value of r opt is between 1 (for h 0 = h 1 ) and c (for h 1 = 0). Furthermore, P M (r) is strictly increasing for r ∈ [1, r opt ) and strictly decreasing for r ∈ (r opt , c], hence r opt is the maximizing argument in (49).
This also implies that if r opt
h 0 , the jammer's optimal strategy is to allocate all of its power to the first block. If, on the other hand, r opt
h 0 , then the jammer's best strategy is to allocate the power J M such that the ratio r = (x 1 /h 1 )/(x 0 /h 0 ) equals the optimal ratio r opt .
The remarks above conclude in the following algorithm:
N h 1 , both transmitter and jammer will only transmit on the first block.
h 0 , the jammer will allocate all its power to the first block, while the transmitter will transmit on both blocks.
h 0 , the jammer will transmit over both blocks such that (x 1 /h 1 )/(x 0 /h 0 ) = r opt , and the transmitter will also be present on both blocks.
Inter-Frame Power Allocation for M > 1: Maximin Solution
In this subsection we present the first level optimal power allocation strategies for the maximin problem, for should be present, and the optimal way J M (h) to distribute its power over X , such that when the transmitter employs its optimal strategy, the probability of outage is maximized.
We already know that given the jammer's strategy, the optimal way of allocating the transmitter's power is such that reliable communication is first obtained on the frames that require the least amount of transmitter power.
The jammer's optimal strategy is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. It is optimal for the jammer to make J M (h) satisfy the power constraint with equality. The optimal jammer strategy for allocating power across frames is to increase the required transmitter power, starting with those frames the channel realizations of which exhibit the steepest instantaneous slope of the characteristic P M (J M ) curve. The jamming power should be allocated such that the required transmitter power over each channel realization where the jammer is present does not exceed a pre-defined level K.
The optimal value for K that maximizes the outage probability can be found numerically, by exhaustive search in a compact interval of the positive real line.
Proof. Let S , X ⊂ R M + denote the sets of channel realizations over which the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Let jammer pick a certain strategy J M (h). Since the transmitter's strategy is predictable, the jammer knows the set S as well as the maximum level of required power that will be matched by the transmitter. Denote this level by K. The required transmitter power should be equal to K over X \ S , since otherwise either the jammer (if larger) or the transmitter (if smaller) would be wasting power.
It suffices to show that two sets
A and h 2 ∈ B, and such that the required P M is less than K on A and J M > 0 on B cannot be part of the maximin solution.
Consider a small enough amount of jamming power δJ M , such that, for any channel realization h ∈ A B, we can modify the jamming power by δJ M without changing the slope of the P M (J M ) curve.
Subtracting δJ M from all frames in B, the jammer obtains the excess power δJ M m(B), which it can allocate uniformly over A . This way, the jammer improves its strategy by forcing the transmitter to allocate more power to the set A B, and hence increases the probability of outage.
Note that the optimal pre-defined constant K should be the limit of at lest one sequence of power levels P M (h) matched by the transmitter.
Hence the optimal K should be searched for in the interval [K min , K max ], where K min is given by the condition that X ⊂ S , and K max can be derived (and updated) in a similar manner as in the M = 1 case: first solve the problem for an arbitrarily chosen K 0 and find the set S 0 of channel realizations over which the transmitter allocates non-zero power; then K max is the least value of K that yields the jamming set X for which S 0 X = ∅.
A description of the technique is given in Figure 7 and is explained by the following algorithm, which assumes discrete jamming power levels and channel coefficient space.
Let P denote a matrix with rows representing the P M (J M ) curves for different channel realizations h, each curve sampled at the discrete jamming power levels J k M , with k = 0, 1, . . . and J 0 M = 0. Let P req be the vector of required powers for the different frames. The initial P req is set equal to the first column of P. Let K min and K max be the limits when searching for the optimal K. k = 0, K = K min .
Let L be an index vector, the same size as P req , with all components equal to 1. (Note that P req (j) = P(j, L(j)).) % Jx strategy:
while Jx power constraint is satisfied (J c ≤ J ) Find row j of P with the largest difference between components L(j) + 1 and L(j), and such that P(j, L(j) + 1) ≤ K. P req (j) = P(j, L(j) + 1). L(j) = L(j) + 1. 
Inter-Frame Power Allocation for M > 1: Minimax Solution
In Theorem 5, we showed that, for the minimax problem, the power allocation within a frame, as well as the relationship between the total powers used by transmitter and receiver over a particular frame, are identical to the maximin problem. Hence, by rotating the P M (J M ) plane, we get the characteristic J M (P M ) curves for the minimax problem.
We already know that given the transmitter's strategy, the optimal way of allocating the jammer's power is such that outage is first induced on the frames that require the least amount of jamming power.
The transmitter's optimal strategy is presented in the following theorem. Theorem 7. It is optimal for transmitter to make P M (h) satisfy the long-term power constraint with equality.
The optimal transmitter power allocation across frames is to increase the required jamming power up to some pre-defined level K, starting with those frames on which the required transmitter power to achieve this goal is least.
The optimal value for K that minimizes the outage probability can be found numerically by exhaustive search.
Proof. Let S and X denote the sets over which the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Let transmitter pick a certain strategy P M (h). Since jammer's strategy is predictable, the transmitter knows the maximum level of required power that will be matched by jammer. Denote this level by K and note that the required jamming power over S \ X should be equal to K (otherwise either the jammer -if smaller than K -or the transmitter -if larger -would be wasting power).
It suffices to show that two sets A , B ⊂ S X of non-zero m-measure such that P M (h 1 , K) < P M (h 2 , K) ∀ h 1 ∈ A and h 2 ∈ B, and such that the required J M is less than K on A and J M > 0 on B cannot be part of the minimax solution. Denote the original transmitter power allocations by P A M,0 (h) and P B M,0 (h) respectively. For any h 1 ∈ A , h 2 ∈ B and J M,1 , J M,2 < K, we have:
where both a) and c) follow from the convexity of J M (P M ) -Proposition 7 -and b) follows from the assumption in the beginning of this proof.
If the transmitter cuts off transmission over a subset B ′ ⊂ B, it obtains the excess power B ′ P M (h)dm(h), which it can allocate to a subset A ′ ⊂ A such that the required J M is equal to K over A ′ , i.e.
Replacing P M (h 1 , J M,1 ) by P A M,0 (h) and P M (h 2 , J M,2 ) by P B M,0 (h) in (51), we see the transmitter improves its strategy by forcing the jammer to allocate more power to the set A B, and hence decreases the probability of outage.
Note that since B ′ ⊂ S X , the set B ′ is in outage, regardless of whether the transmitter is present or not. Thus, transmitter does not increase P out by cutting off transmission on B ′ .
The optimal value of K should be larger than K min = J . An upper bound K max can be found (and updated) similarly as in the M = 1 case: first solve the problem for an arbitrarily chosen K 0 , and determine the set S 0 \ X 0 over which the transmitter achieves reliable communication; then K max is the value that yields S = S 0 \ X 0 .
Let P denote a matrix with rows representing the P M (J M ) curves for different channel realizations h, each curve sampled at the discrete jamming power levels J k M , with k = 0, 1, . . . and J 0 M = 0. Let K max be value where searching for the optimal K stops. k = 0. 
Numerical Results
We have computed the outage probabilities for both minimax and maximin problems when M = 2. The channel coefficients are assumed i.i.d. exponentially distributed with parameter λ = 1/6. Figure 8 shows the outage probability vs. the maximum allowable average transmitter power P for fixed J = 10 when R = 1.
For comparison purposes, we also provide results for the cases when M = 1 and when the jammer is not present (J = 0).
The almost constant value segments are a consequence of channel coefficient discretization which combined with exponential probability densities produces P M (J M ) curves with high probability of occurrence and high slopes.
Numerical results demonstrate a sharp difference between minimax solutions and maxmin solutions, which implies the non-existence of Nash-equilibria of this two-person zero-sum game.
In addition, note that increasing M from 1 to 2 produces an increase in the outage probability for the minimax, and a decrease for the maximin. This can be explained by the fact that the first player is always at a disadvantage, and this disadvantage increases as the second player gains degrees of freedom.
Conclusion
The Gaussian uncorrelated jamming problem in block fading channels with constraints on power and transmission delay is formulated as a two-player, zero-sum game, with the outage probability as the cost/reward function.
A Nash equilibrium was derived for the short-term power constraints case. For long-term power constraints, optimal power control strategies for both jammer and transmitter were obtained for the maxmin and minimax solutions.
The power control strategies consist of two phases. In the first phase, the two players decide the power allocation across frames. In the second phase, power allocations over the M > 1 blocks within a frame are determined for the two players. The block-wise power allocation strategies are identical for the maximin and minimax solutions, while the power allocation between frames is done quite differently. This difference supports the statement of Theorem 3, that no Nash equilibrium exists when long-term power constraints are considered.
A Short-Term Power Constraints -Proofs of Main Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is an adaptation of the results in Section IV.B of [7] , regarding uncorrelated jamming with CSI at the transmitter. The only difference is that in our case, the power constraints and cost function involve short-term, temporal averages, while in [7] , they are expressed in terms of statistical averages. Nevertheless, the same techniques can be applied. Writing the KKT conditions for both optimization problems we get [7] :
where γ(h) and δ(h) are the complementary slackness variables for P (h) and J(h), respectively.
The three possible cases are [7] : Case 1: P (h) > 0, J(h) > 0; Case 2: P (h) > 0, J(h) = 0 and Case 3:
For Case 1 both complementary slackness variables are 0, and solving (53) and (54) together we get
and
while for Cases 2 and 3, the solution is plain water-filling [7] .
These considerations result in the solutions (5) and (6).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This proof follows the one described in the Appendix B of [10] . The probability of outage can be written as:
where χ {A } denotes the indicator function of the set A . Replacing the power allocations by the solutions of the game described by (3) and (4), we define
Then the region U(R, P, J ) can be written as:
We next use the fact that the pair (P * (h), J * (h)) determines an equilibrium of the game (3), (4). Thus, for any random power allocation P (h) satisfying the power constraint, we can write:
Similarly, for any random J(h), we have
Now pick some arbitrary power allocation functions P a (h) and J a (h), which satisfy the short-term power constraints, and set
It is easy to see that 1/M M −1 m=0 P (h m ) ≤ P with probability 1 , 1/M M −1 m=0 J(h m ) ≤ J with probability 1, and moreover that
Note that transmitter and jammer could pick P a (h) = 0 and J a (h) = 0 respectively, but this strategy would not improve their performances (power cannot be saved), since the only power constraints are set over frames.
Now, using (57), (60) and (61), we get:
which proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
B Long-Term Power Constraints
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider that the transmitter picks a certain strategy P M (h). Because the jammer's strategy is now predictable, the transmitter knows exactly the set X over which the jammer is present, as well as the maximum level of required jamming power that will be matched by jammer. Denote this level by K.
Consider two sets A , B ⊂ X , of non-zero m-measure, such that h 1 < h 2 , ∀h 1 ∈ A , h 2 ∈ B,
We show that if this is the case, then for the same K, the transmitter can improve its strategy., i.e. there is a different choice of P M (h), which maintains the level K, but requires more power from the jammer to induce outage over the same X . But since the jammer already uses all of its power for the first choice of P M (h), and the required jamming power outside X is larger than K, the jammer has no choice but to reduce the set X to one of its proper subsets. This is equivalent to decreasing the probability of outage.
Hence, such a pair of sets cannot exist as part of the minimax solution.
The technique used in this proof is similar to the one used in the proof of proposition 2 and is depicted in Figure 9 .
Denote the jammer's power allocation functions over A and B by J M,1 (h) and J M,2 (h) respectively. 
We are trying to take some of the transmitter's power from A and use it over B, without modifying the total power invested by the transmitter over A B. There are two cases.
Case I: Assume that we can take enough transmitter power from A , in order to make the required jamming power over B equal to K. That is, there exists a positive J M,3 (h) > 0, such that Hence the transmitter is required to use more power in achieving reliable communication over A B.
Case II: Now suppose that the transmitter's power on A is not enough to make the required jamming power on B equal to K. Then the transmitter can just stop transmitting over A , and use the saved power to increase the required jamming power on B from J M,2 (h) to some J M,4 (h) ≤ K. That is, we assume we can find some power allocation function P M,4 (h) ≤ K such that 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Take Problem 1. Let (P * , J * ) = (P * 0 , P * 1 , . . . , P * M −1 ), (J * 0 , J * 1 , . . . , J * M −1 ) be a solution such that M −1 i=0 P * i = P M,1 and M −1 i=0 J * i = J M,1 , and assume that I M (P * , J * ) > R. Since I M is a continuous, strictly increasing function of P 0 , without loss of generality, we can find P ′ 0 < P * 0 such that I M ((P ′ 0 , P * 1 , . . . , P * M −1 ), J * ) = R. But then P ′ 0 + M −1 m=1 P * m < M P M,1 , which means that (P * , J * ) is suboptimal (from the transmitter's point of view), and hence not a solution.
Therefore, the first constraint has to be satisfied with equality. Now take the solution (P * , J * ), and assume that 1 M M −1 m=0 J * m < J M,1 . Then we can find J ′ 0 > J * 0 , such that J ′ 0 + M −1 m=1 J * m = M J M . In order for the first constraint to be satisfied, the value and distribution of P M will have to be modified.
We prove next that the value of P M should be increased, which makes the pair (P * , J * ) suboptimal (from the jammer's point of view), thus contradicting the hypothesis that it is a solution, and proving that the second constraint should hold with equality. strategy X 0 M ′′ can be considered as a particular feasible solution for the case of M ′′ + 1 blocks, it should yield the same value of P M as X 0 M ′′ +1 . But this is in violation of Lemma 1. If X 0 M ′′ +1 = X 0 M ′′ , Proposition 6 holds by (38). If x M ′′ +1,M ′′ > σ 2 N , then by increasing J M we can obtain an optimal solution for which x M ′′ +1,M ′′ = σ 2 N . This is also a (unique) solution for the case when only M ′′ blocks are considered, and Proposition 6 holds by (38). But (43) implies that decreasing J M back to the original value can only decrease the optimal values of x M ′′ ,n , so Proposition 6 still holds.
The arguments above also imply that an optimal solution has µ > 0, where µ is the constant given by (44). From (37) we already know that µ ≥ 0. Suppose that the optimal solution of Problem 1 yields an M ′ and an M ′′ for which we obtain µ = 0. Then by (42) P n = 0 for n ∈ M ′′ . By Proposition 6 this means that either the transmitter does not transmit at all, or it does not pick an optimal strategy. Both hypotheses are false, so µ has to be strictly positive.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We prove the concavity of P M (J M ) in three steps. First, we show that the optimal vector X * = (x * n ) M −1 over M ′′ blocks has got to be better than, or at least as good as X 2 . However, since x 1,M ′′ = σ 2 N , X 1 is a feasible solution for the case when the jammer is considered to transmit over M ′′ + 1 blocks. But it can be neither better than X 2 , since X 2 is the optimal solution in this case, nor as good as X 2 (this would contradict Lemma 1). Therefore X * (J M ) is a continuous injection.
The next lemma deals with the second step of the proof. (91) Note that except the first term in the nominator, which increases with µ, all other terms are decreasing with µ, hence implying that the derivative increases with µ.
